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I present direct evidence on the role of rm-to-rm labor mobility
in enhancing the productivity of rms located near highly produc-
tive rms. Using matched employer-employee and balance sheet
data for the Veneto region of Italy, I identify a set of high-wage
rms (HWF) and show they are more productive than other rms.
I then show that hiring a worker with HWF experience increases
the productivity of other (non-HWF) rms. A simulation indi-
cates that worker ows explain 10-15 percent of the productivity
gains experienced by other rms when HWFs in the same industry
are added to a local labor market.
JEL: J24; J31; J61; R23
Keywords: productivity, agglomeration advantages, linked
employer-employee data, labor mobility.
A prominent feature of the economic landscape in the most developed countries
is the tendency for rms to locate near other rms producing similar products
or services. In the United States, for example, biopharmaceutical rms are clus-
tered in New York and Chicago and a sizeable share of the elevator and escalator
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industry is concentrated in the area around Bloomington, Indiana. In addition,
the growth and di¤usion of multinational corporations has led to the recent ap-
pearance of important industrial clusters in several emerging economies. Firms
that originally agglomerated in Silicon Valley and Detroit now have subsidiaries
clustered in Bangalore and Slovakia (Alfaro and Chen, 2010).
Researchers have long speculated that rms in industrial concentrations may
benet from agglomeration economies, and a growing body of work has been
devoted to studying the importance of these economies. Despite the di¢ cul-
ties involved in estimating agglomeration e¤ects, a consensus has emerged from
the literature that signicant productivity advantages of agglomeration exist for
many industries (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Henderson, 2003; Ellison, Glaeser
and Kerr, 2010; Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti, 2010; Combes et al., 2012).
Localized knowledge spillovers are a common explanation for the productivity
advantages of agglomeration. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Combes and Du-
ranton (2006), if information can easily ow out of rms, the question of why the
e¤ects of spillovers are localized must be claried.
This paper directly examines the role of labor mobility as a mechanism for
the transfer of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge and evaluates the extent to which
labor mobility can explain the productivity advantages of rms located near other
highly productive rms. The underlying idea is that knowledge is embedded in
workers and di¤uses when workers move between rms. The strong localized
aspect of knowledge spillovers discussed in the agglomeration literature may thus
arise from the propensity of workers to change jobs within the same local labor
market.
In order to empirically assess the importance of labor-market based knowledge
spillovers, I use a unique dataset from the Veneto region of Italy that combines
Social Security earnings records and detailed nancial information for rms. I
begin by presenting a simple conceptual framework where some rms are more
productive because they have some superior knowledge. Employees at these rms
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passively acquire some proportion of the rms internal knowledge. For simplicity,
I refer to these as "knowledgeable" workers. Other rms can gain access to the
superior knowledge by hiring these workers. Empirically, I identify potential high-
productivity rms as those that pay a relatively high rm-specic wage premium.1
I show that these high-wage-rms (HWFs) have higher labor productivity, higher
value added, and higher capital (in particular intangible capital) per worker,
suggesting the presence of a rm-specic productivity advantage and thus a point
of origin for the transfer of knowledge. Next, I evaluate the extent to which
non HWFs benet from hiring knowledgeable workers by studying the e¤ect on
productivity associated with hiring workers with recent experience at HWFs.
Productivity shocks that are correlated with the propensity to hire knowledge-
able workers may give rise to an upward bias in the impact of knowledgeable
workers. In order to address this potential endogeneity issue, I use control func-
tion methods from the recent productivity literature (Olley and Pakes, 1996;
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Another potential threat to identication is the
fact that I do not observe labor quality. In particular, since the good rms pay
a relatively high rm-specic wage premium, workers who separate from a good
rm may be of lower quality. I refer to this potential adverse selection problem as
"lemons bias" (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Lemons bias will tend to work against
the nding of a positive e¤ect of knowledgeable workers. In order to address this
issue, I obtain a proxy for worker ability and I weight the number of workers in
my OLS regression using the average ability to obtain e¤ective labor input.
I conclude that hiring a worker with HWF experience signicantly increases the
productivity of other (non HWF) rms. A non HWF hiring at the mean gains
0.14-0.28 percent in productivity compared to an observationally identical rm
that hired no knowledgeable workers. This gain is equivalent to moving 0.2-0.5
centiles up the productivity distribution for the median rm. The productivity
1This is consistent with many recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Christensen et al., 2005),
in which higher-productivity rms pay higher wages for equivalent workers.
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e¤ect of knowledgeable workers is not associated with recently hired workers in
general; I do not nd a similar productivity e¤ect for recently hired workers
without experience at good rms.
Even when contemporaneous productivity shocks in hiring rms have been
controlled away, the number of knowledgeable workers may still be correlated
with productivity shocks happening in the future if workers can foresee them
and apply for jobs in rms with better growth prospects. To deal with this
threat to identication, I adapt the control function methods to proxy for future
productivity shocks. As an alternative approach, I instrument for the number
of knowledgeable workers in a non HWF with the number of local good rms
in the same industry that downsized in the previous period. Indeed, following
a downsizing event at a HWF, it is more likely that a knowledgeable worker
applies for job at local non HWFs because s/he is unemployed and does not want
to relocate far away, and not because some particular non HWF o¤ers better
prospects than the HWF at which the worker is employed. This instrumental
variable (IV) strategy also further guards against the possibility of lemons bias:
the larger the number of workers laid o¤ from HWFs, the lower, arguably, the
extent of selection. The IV estimates return an economically and statistically
signicant e¤ect of recruiting knowledgeable workers on non HWF productivity,
with the point estimate larger than the OLS. While in principle this is consistent
with the idea that the OLS coe¢ cient is biased downward (lemons bias), in
practice the IV standard errors are large and prevent me from drawing denitive
conclusions.
In the last part of the paper, I assess the extent to which worker ows can ex-
plain the productivity advantages of rms located near other highly productive
rms. I relate my ndings to the existing evidence on the productivity advantages
of agglomeration, focusing in particular on the study performed in Greenstone,
Hornbeck and Moretti (2010, henceforth GHM). The authors nd that after the
opening of a large manufacturing establishment, total factor productivity (TFP)
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of incumbent plants in US counties that were able to attract one of these large
plants increases signicantly relative to the TFP of incumbent plants in counties
that survived a long selection process but narrowly lost the competition. The
observed e¤ect on TFP is larger if incumbent plants are in the same industry
as the large plant, and increases over time. These two facts are consistent with
the presence of intellectual externalities that are embodied in workers who move
from rm to rm. However, data limitations prevent GHM from drawing de-
nitive conclusions regarding the driving mechanism. I evaluate the extent to
which worker ows explain empirical evidence on the productivity advantages
of agglomeration, by simulating an event similar to that studied by GHM but
within the worker mobility framework described above. The change in produc-
tivity predicted within this framework equals 10-15 percent of the overall e¤ect
found in GHM, indicating that knowledge transfer through worker ows explain
a signicant portion of the productivity advantages through agglomeration.
I. Relation to Previous Research
This paper adds to the growing literature on productivity advantages through
agglomeration, a literature critically surveyed in Duranton and Puga (2004),
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Moretti (2011). The research relating most
closely to this paper is the body of work on micro-foundations for agglomeration
advantages based on knowledge spillovers. In Combes and Duranton (2006)s
theoretical analysis, rms clustering in the same locality face a trade-o¤ between
the advantages of labor pooling (i.e. access to knowledge carriers) and the costs
of labor poaching (i.e. loss of some key employees to competitors along with
higher wage bills to retain other key employees). In a case study of the British
Motor Valley, Henry and Pinch (2000) conclude that
as personnel move, they bring with them knowledge and ideas
about how things are done in other rms helping to raise the knowl-
edge throughout the industry...The crucial point is that whilst this
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process may not change the pecking order within the industry, this
churningof personnel raises the knowledge base of the industry as
a whole within the region. The knowledge community is continually
reinvigorated and, synonymous with this, so is production within Mo-
tor Sport Valley
In a similar vein, Saxenian (1996) maintains that the geographic proximity of
high-tech rms in Silicon Valley is associated with a more e¢ cient ow of new
ideas. I contribute to the literature on micro-foundations for agglomeration ad-
vantages by showing direct evidence of productivity gains through worker ows.
My results are consistent with the ndings by Henry and Pinch (2000). Since
worker ows in a local labor market are larger within an industry, and, as I shall
show, the productivity e¤ect is larger for workers moving within the same indus-
try, my results may also help explain the ndings in Henderson (2003), Cingano
and Schivardi (2004) and Moretti (2004a) that local spillovers are increasing in
economic proximity.2
Some research beyond the agglomeration literature has also emphasized the
fact that new workers share ideas on how to organize production or information
on new technologies that they learned with their previous employer. Balsvik
(2011) uses matched employer-employee data from Norway and o¤ers a detailed
account of productivity gains linked to worker ows from foreign multinational
to domestic rms. Similarly, using linked worker-rm data, Parrotta and Pozzoli
(2012) and Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) show evidence from Denmark that is
consistent with models of knowledge di¤usion through labor mobility. My nd-
ings are consistent with those of these three recent papers. My empirical strategy,
however, allows me to make progress on the identication of the causal e¤ect of
recruiting knowledgeable workers on productivity. I address the three main iden-
tication issues, namely (a) unobservable contemporaneous productivity shocks
at time t, (b) unobservable worker quality and (c) unobservable future productiv-
2Measures of economic links include input and output ows and indicators of technological linkages.
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ity shocks, using several approaches, including control function methods from the
recent productivity literature and an IV strategy. Furthermore, while the above
authors focus exclusively on the role of labor mobility for knowledge transfer, I
seek to shed light on a broader question: the extent to which labor mobility can
explain evidence on the productivity advantages through agglomeration.
II. Conceptual Framework
Assume there exists a nite number of locations, each constituting a separate
local labor market. To x ideas, assume that these labor markets are completely
segmented with workers being immobile between them. There exists a nite
collection J = fJ0;J1g of rms consisting of the set J1 good rms, which are
more productive because they have some superior knowledge and set J0 other
rms which have no access to the superior knowledge. The superior knowledge
is exogenously given and could include information about export markets, phys-
ical capital, process innovations, new managerial techniques, new organizational
forms and intermediate inputs. Workers employed by good rms acquire some
proportion of the rmsinternal knowledge. For simplicity, I assume that this
acquisition of internal knowledge takes place immediately after the workers join
the good rm. Workers are knowledgeable if they have knowledge of the relevant
information and unknowledgeable otherwise. All workers employed by good rms,
then, are knowledgeable. Additionally, some proportion of this knowledge can be
transferred to a j 2 J0 rm if the workers switch employers.3 The production
function of rm j 2 J0 is
(1) Yj = F (Lj ;Kj ;Mj) = Aj [(jLj)K

jM

j ]

where L = H + N; i.e. the sum of knowledgeable workers (H;who moved at
some point from a good rm to a non-good rm) and unknowledgeable workers
3 I assume that this type of knowledge cannot all be patented and that exclusive labor contracts are
not available.
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(N);  is the quality of the workforce, K is total capital inputs, M is material
inputs, and  < 1 represent an element of diminishing return to scale, or to "span
of control" in the managerial technology (Lucas, 1978).4 I allow for knowledge
transfer by:
(2) Aj = DjeHHj
III. Identication
I obtain the regression equation that forms the basis of my empirical analysis,
by combining equation (1) and (2) and taking logs:
(3) ln(Yjslt)= L ln(jsltLjslt)+K ln(Kjslt)+M ln(Mjslt)+HHjslt+0+jslt
The dependent variable is the real value of total rm production, s denotes
industry, l denotes locality and t denotes year.5 The variable of interest, H
is constructed from head counts in the matched employer-employee data. The
term ln(Dj) is decomposed into two elements, 0 and jslt. The constant 0
denotes mean e¢ ciency across all rms in J0 that is due to factors others than
H. The time-variant jslt represents deviations from this mean e¢ ciency level
and captures (a) unobserved factors a¤ecting rm output, (b) measurement error
in inputs and output, and (c) random noise. Estimating the e¤ect of recruiting a
knowledgeable worker on a rms productivity is di¢ cult in the presence of un-
observable contemporaneous productivity shocks, unobserved labor quality and
unobservable future productivity shocks. I turn now to describing what type
of biases these unobservables may introduce and how I deal with them in the
empirical work.
4This is in line with the large presence, that I document below, of small and medium size rms in
the non-HWF sample.
5Notice that L = ; K = ; M = :
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A. Productivity shocks at time t
Express jslt , the deviations from mean rm e¢ ciency not resulting from
knowledge transfer, as
(4) jslt = !

jslt + jslt = !jslt + st +$lt + jslt
which species that jslt contains measurement error jslt and a productivity
component !jslt (TFP) known to the rm but unobserved by the econometrician.
The productivity component can be further divided into a rm-specic term, a
term common to all rms in a given industry (st) and a term common to all
rms in a given locality ($lt). Equation (3) now becomes:
(5)
ln(Yjslt)= 0 + L ln(jsltLjslt)+K ln(Kjslt)+M ln(Mjslt)+HHjslt+st+$lt+!jslt+vjslt
One major di¢ culty in estimating H in Equation (5) is that non HWFs may
decide on their choice of H based on the realized rm-specic productivity shock
(!jslt) unknown to the researcher. When employing OLS to estimate Equation
(5) without accounting for the existence of !jslt; the bias induced by endogeneity
between H and !jslt is likely positive (positive productivity shocks translate into
higher probability to hire from HWFs), implying that the coe¢ cient estimate
will be biased upward (cH > H).
I employ the productivity literatures techniques to control for the endogeneity
of inputs in order to assess the relevance of this issue in my setting. In particular,
I apply the Olley and Pakes (1996, henceforth OP) and the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003, henceforth LP) approaches. OP construct an explicit model for the rms
optimization problem in order to obtain their production function estimator. Es-
sentially, the authors address the issue of endogeneity of inputs by inverting the
investment function to back out and thus control for productivity. Building
on OP, LP suggest the use of intermediate input demand in place of investment
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demand as a proxy for unobserved productivity. The results are shown in Sec-
tion VI. See Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) for an in-depth discussion of these
structuralestimators.
B. Unobserved Worker Quality
Another potential threat to identication is the fact that I do not observe labor
quality. In particular, since the good rms pay a relatively high rm-specic wage
premium, workers who separate from a good rm may be of lower quality. This
lemons bias may work against the nding of a positive e¤ect of knowledgeable
workers. In order to address this issue, I obtain a proxy for worker ability and
I weight the number of workers in my OLS regression using the average ability
to obtain e¤ective labor input. Specically, I weight the total number of workers
L by rm js average worker ability level jslt = 1Ljslt
LjsltX
i=1
i, to obtain e¤ective
labor input. jslt is time-varying at the rm level, given that the number and
composition of workers change. In order to obtain the individual i, I procure
estimates of worker xed e¤ects from wage equations where both rm and worker
e¤ects can be identied. Section III.E describes this estimation in detail.
The IV strategy based on the events of downsizing at good rms (described in
Section III.D) further guards against the possibility of lemons bias: the larger
the number of workers laid o¤ from HWFs, the lower, arguably, the extent of
selection.
C. Productivity shocks at time t+1
Even when contemporaneous productivity shocks in hiring rms have been
controlled away, the number of knowledgeable workers may still be correlated
with productivity shocks happening in the future if workers can foresee them and
apply for jobs at rms with better growth prospects. If such rms prefer to hire
workers from good rms, these workers will have a higher probability of being
chosen. To the extent that preferring workers from good rms can be explained
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through knowledge transfer from these rms, a positive correlation between H
and the receiving rms productivity shocks in t+1 does suggest a role for labor
mobility as a channel for knowledge transfer, even though it will overestimate its
importance (Stoyanov and Zubanov, 2012).
In an e¤ort to proxy for productivity shocks in t+1 that may be anticipated by
the workers, I add polynomial functions of capital and investment and of capital
and materials in both t and t+1. This is in the spirit of the OP and LP approaches
and assumes that hiring rms are also able to anticipate their productivity shocks
and adjust their inputs accordingly. As an alternative approach to deal with this
issue, I adopt an IV strategy that I now describe.
D. Using the number of downsizing rms as IV
In Section VI.B I present estimates where I instrument for the number of knowl-
edgeable workers in a non HWF with the number of local good rms in the same
industry that downsized in the previous period. The IV strategy is an alterna-
tive approach to deal with the strategic mobility issue discussed in the previous
section. Indeed following a downsizing event at a HWF, it is more likely that a
knowledgeable worker applies for job at local non HWFs because s/he is unem-
ployed and does not want to relocate far away, and not because some particular
non HWFs o¤er better prospects than the HWF at which the worker is employed.
Put di¤erently, in the scenario captured by the IV approach, the strategic mo-
bility explanation is less likely to play a major role.
The choice of the instrument is based on the idea that geographic proximity
plays an important role in determining worker mobility. In January 2012, I
visited several Veneto rms and interviewed employees about the history of their
enterprises and their current operations. I also conducted phone interviews with
o¢ cials of employers associations and chambers of commerce. My anecdotal
evidence supports the notion that distance acts as a barrier for job mobility.6 In
6 In a phone interview, Federico Callegari of the Treviso Chamber of Commerce, reasoned out the role
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section A.III I further discuss the role of geographic proximity.
One can think of two main reasons why good rms may downsize in a par-
ticular year. First, good rms may get a bad draw from the distribution of
product-market conditions. Even though an inherent productivity advantage
partly insulates the good rms from output shocks, su¢ ciently large shocks will
pierce this insulation and induce the good rm to layo¤ workers. Alternatively,
good rms may downsize in a particular year due to o¤shoring.
In the presence of product demand shocks or o¤shoring, using the number of
downsizing rms as an instrument is invalid if it cannot be excluded from the
causal model of interest (Equation 3). The identifying assumption of my IV
strategy is therefore that the number of downsizing good rms is correlated with
the causal variable of interest;H; but uncorrelated with any other unobserved
determinants of productivity.
E. Identication of Good Firms
Empirically, I identify potential high-productivity rms as high-wage rms
(HWFs), i.e. those that pay a relatively high rm-specic wage premium. This is
consistent with many recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Christensen
et al., 2005), in which higher-productivity rms pay higher wages for equivalent
workers. As I shall show below using balance sheet data, HWFs have signicant
higher output per worker and value added per worker than other rms in my
sample.
There are three reasons why I dene the good rms as HWFs and detect them
using Social Security data rather than dene the good rms directly as the highly
productive ones and detect them using balance sheet data. First, the availability
of worker-level Social Security data allows the introduction of measured individual
characteristics and worker e¤ects, something impossible to capture with rm level
of geographic proximity: I think distance matters a lot for workersjob mobility. When losing their job,
workers tend to look for another job with a commuting time of maximum 20-30 minutes. Why? Because
they want to go home during the lunch break!"
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data from balance sheets. Second, Social Security data are available for a longer
period of time than the balance sheets, and therefore increase the precision of
the categorization of rms into good and non-good groups. Third, since Social
Security records are administrative data, measurement error is lower than in
balance sheets.
Following Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999, henceforth AKM), I specify a
loglinear statistical model of wages as follows:
(6) wijt = X 0it + i +  j + vt + "ijt
where the dependent variable, the log of the average daily wage earned by worker
i in rm j in year t, is expressed as a function of individual heterogeneity, rm
heterogeneity, and measured time-varying characteristics.7 The assumptions for
the statistical residual "ijt are (a) E["ijtji; j; t; x] = 0, (b) V ar["ijtji; j; t; x] <
1 and (c) orthogonality to all other e¤ects in the model. The presence of labor
mobility in matched worker-rm data sets enables the identication of worker and
rm e¤ects.8 I identify good rms as those whose estimated rm xed e¤ects fall
within the top third of all estimated rm e¤ects. Section IV reports more details
on the estimation procedure.
IV. Data
The data set is for Veneto, an administrative region in the Northeast of Italy
with a population of around 5 million people (8 percent of the countrys total).
Since the mid-1980s, the labor market in Veneto has been characterized by nearly
full employment, a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing and positive
migration ows (Tattara and Valentini, 2010). The dynamic regional economy
7The vector X0it includes tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared, a dummy variable for manager
and white collar status, and interaction terms between gender and other individual characteristics.
8The identication relies on the assumption that mobility is exogenous to the included regressors.
Bias in the estimated rm e¤ects arises when errors predict specic rm-to-rm transitions. Card,
Heining and Kline (2012) conduct a series of checks for patterns of endogenous mobility that could lead
to systematic bias in AKMs additive worker and rm e¤ects model. The authors nd little evidence of
such biases in German data.
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features a large presence of exible rms, frequently organized in districts with
a level of industrial value added greatly exceeding the national average.9 Manu-
facturing rms in Veneto specialize in metal-engineering, goldsmithing, plastics,
furniture, garments, textiles, leather and shoes.10 The manufacture of food and
beverage, and wine and baked goods in particular, is also a prominent subsector.
My data set pools three sources of information: individual earnings records,
rm balance sheets, and information on local labor markets (LLMs).11 The earn-
ings records come from the Veneto Workers History (VWH) dataset. The VWH
has data on all private sector personnel in the Veneto region over the period
1975-2001. Specically, it contains register-based information for virtually any
job lasting at least one day. A complete employment history has been recon-
structed for each worker.
Balance sheets starting from 1995 were obtained from AIDA (Analisi Infor-
matizzata delle Aziende), a database circulated by Bureau Van Dijk containing
o¢ cial records of all incorporated nonnancial Italian rms with annual revenues
of at least 500,000 Euros. AIDAs balance sheets include rmslocation, revenues,
total wage bill, the book value of capital (broken into subgroups), value added,
number of employees, value of materials and industry code. I use rm identiers
to match job-year observations for workers aged 16-64 in the VWH with rm
nancial data in AIDA for the period 1995-2001. Further details on the match
and data restrictions I make are provided in Section A.I.
Information on LLMs is obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (IS-
TAT). The LLMs are territorial groupings of municipalities characterized by a
certain degree of working-day commuting by the resident population. In 1991
the 518 municipalities or comuni in Veneto are divided into 51 LLMs.
9The most famous industrial concentration is the eyewear district in the province of Belluno, where
Luxottica, the worlds largest manufacturer of eyeglasses, has production plants.
10Benetton, Sisley, Geox, Diesel, and Replay are Venetian brands.
11The rst two sources, combined for the period 1995-2001, have been used in the study on rent-
sharing, hold-up and wages by Card, Devicienti and Maida (2010).
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V. AKM Estimation and Characterization of Good Firms
The method in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) identies separate groups
of workers and rms that are connected via labor mobility in matched employer-
employee data. When a group of workers and rms is connected, the group
contains all persons who ever worked for any rm within the group and all rms
at which any of the persons were ever employed. I run the grouping algorithm
separately using VWH data from 1987 to 2000 for rms that could be matched
in AIDA. I then use the created group variable to choose the largest group as a
sample for my xed-e¤ects estimation - Equation (6). Details on sample restric-
tions and descriptive statistics are provided in Section A.I. Figure A1 shows the
distribution of estimated rm e¤ects.
I identify HWFs as those rms whose rm e¤ects rank in the top third of the
sample. Figure A2 shows the geographical variation in the number of HWFs
across LLMs for the most recent year (2001).
For labor mobility to generate productivity benets of agglomeration, a rm-
specic advantage should be observed at good rms that could be the basis for
knowledge transfer to other rms in the region. Therefore, once I have categorized
rms into HWF and non HWF groups, I estimate:
(7) lnOjst= 0 + 1HWFjs + s + vt + ejst
where the dummy HWF takes the value of 1 if rm j is classied as high-wage
and Ojst represents di¤erent rm-level outcomes. Table 1 shows the results of
estimating Equation (7).
[TABLE 1 HERE]
In the Veneto manufacturing sector clear di¤erences between HWFs and non
HWFs emerge in labor productivity (measured as output per worker, Column 1),
value added per worker (Column 2) and capital per worker (Column 3), including
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both tangible capital (Column 4) and, most remarkably, intangible xed assets
(Column 5). This evidence is important for establishing the potential for knowl-
edge transfer in the region. Since labor productivity is on average 15 percent
higher in HWFs, and intangible capital per worker (intellectual property, accu-
mulated research and development investments and goodwill) is 27 percent larger,
we can also think of HWFs as high-productivity rms, or high-intangible-capital
rms.
For labor mobility to be a mechanism for transfer of knowledge, we must also
observe some workers moving from HWFs to other rms. Section A.II discusses
the extent of labor mobility from HWF to non HWF. It also presents descriptive
statistics on individual characteristics of the movers in my sample.
VI. Evidence on Worker Flows and Productivity
A. Main Estimates
In this section I present the main result from regression analysis in this paper.
Specically, I evaluate the extent to which non HWFs benet from hiring workers
from HWFs. Estimation of Equation (3) is performed over the period for which
balance sheet data are available (1995-2001). Details on sample restrictions and
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis are provided
in Section A.I. Table 2 shows the estimation results. I cluster standard errors at
the rm level. Coe¢ cients associated with the H measure in Table 2 represent
semielasticities because my variable of interest is not in logarithms. This choice
for the baseline specication, which directly follows from Equation (2), is founded
on the fact that H takes on the value 0 for the majority of observations. Thus,
any possible transformation of the H measure could possibly a¤ect the associated
estimated parameters. In any case, in Section A.IV I show results using di¤erent
functional forms.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
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Column 1 reports estimate from the baseline OLS specication: the coe¢ cient
on Hjst is positive (0.039) and signicant.12 Column 2 and 3 of Table 2 employ
the productivity literatures techniques to control for the endogeneity of inputs.
Hjst is treated as a freely variable input. Column 2 reports results using the OP
estimator: the coe¢ cient for Hjst is positive (0.037) and signicant.13 Column
3 reports the results for LP estimator: the coe¢ cient for Hjst is positive (0.020)
and signicant; it is lower than the OLS estimate, conrming the theoretical and
empirical results on variable inputs discussed in LP.14
Although the estimate of the coe¢ cients forHjst in the OP and LP specication
are smaller than the baseline estimate, none of the specications is qualitatively
inconsistent with the empirical nding that labor mobility works as a channel
of knowledge transfer. The point estimates suggest that the average e¤ect of
recruiting a knowledgeable worker on a non HWFs productivity is an increase of
between 2 and 3.9 percent. In order to put this result into context, it should be
noted that non-HWFs are quite small: the median number of employees at non
HWFs is 33. Moreover, as discussed in Section A.II, hiring from a HWF is not a
common event.
As a further illustration of Table 2s estimates, given the mean value ofH (0.07)
and its slope coe¢ cient in Column 1, cH =0:039, a non-HWF hiring at the mean
H gains 0:0390:07 = 0:28 percent in productivity compared to an observationally
identical rm that hired no-one. This gain is equivalent to moving 0.5 centiles
up the productivity distribution for the median rm. If one uses the LP estimate
12All inputs are positive and statistically signicant, and the labor coe¢ cient is an expected 71% of the
summed coe¢ cients for labor and capital. The overall production function has mild decreasing returns
to scale, with a 1 percent increase in all inputs leading to a 0.9 percent increase in output.
13 I use the opreg Stata routine developed by Yasar, Raciborski and Poi (2008). I do not observe
investment, and hence derived a proxy variable in t as the di¤erence between the reported book value of
capital at time t + 1 and its value in t: The way I constructed the proxy variable somehow exacerbates
the measurement error problems typically associated with the proxy variable approach. In addition,
augmenting my specication with this proxy variable reduces my sample size substantially, as (a) 3871
rm-year observations are lost when I take the di¤erence in reported book values and (b) the OP approach
requires positive values for the proxy variable, eliminating an additional 7174 rm-year observations. (The
estimation routine will truncate rmsnon-positive proxy variable observations because the monotonicity
condition necessary to invert the investment function, and hence back out productivity, does not hold
for these observations.)
14 I use the levpet Stata routine developed by Petrin, Poi and Levinsohn (2004).
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instead of the OLS, the gain is equal to 0:14 percent (0:2 centiles up in the
distribution).
In an e¤ort to proxy for productivity shocks in t+1 that may be anticipated
by the workers (recall the discussion in Section III.C), in Column 4 and 5 I add
polynomial functions of capital and investments or capital and materials in t and
t + 1. These estimates also suggest that non HWFs benet from knowledgeable
workers by experiencing increased productivity.15 In Section VI.B I show results
from the IV strategy, an alternative approach to deal with the strategic mobility
issue that may arise as a result of the presence of unobservable shocks in t+ 1.
Next, I address the questions of whether the knowledge embedded in workers
is general enough to be applied in di¤erent industries: Column 6 of Table 2
di¤erentiates between workers with HWF experience moving within the same
two-digit industry and workers moving between industries. The coe¢ cient of
knowledgeable workers moving within industry is highly signicant and positive
(0.072). The coe¢ cient of knowledgeable workers moving between industries is
signicant and positive but smaller (0.024). The di¤erence in the two coe¢ cients
is signicant at conventional levels.
Overall, the main empirical result in this Section is that labor mobility from
HWFs to other rms in the region works as a mechanism for the transfer of
e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge. Hiring within the same industry brings more
relevant new knowledge than that which can be acquired from workers previously
employed outside.
Section A.IV investigates the robustness of these ndings to di¤erent specica-
tions and explores potential alternative explanations of the estimated productiv-
ity e¤ects. In particular, I investigate the role of the selection of movers based on
observable characteristics and unobserved rm heterogeneity. I also evaluate the
role of functional form assumptions, and I explore the importance of time-varying
15That said, most of the components in the polynomial approximations are statistically signicant,
implying that these extra terms contribute in explaining the variation in productivity among rms.
Notice the drop in observations due to the fact that we are using the leads of inputs (polynomials in
t+ 1).
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unobservables correlated with the number of recent hires.
B. IV Estimates
In this section I instrument for the number of knowledgeable workers using the
lagged number of good local rms in the same 5-digit industry that downsized
in the previous period. This exercise is motivated by the possibility of strategic
mobility and lemons bias that I discussed above. The exclusion restriction is
violated and cHIV is biased upward if there are localized unobservable industry
shocks that lead good rms to downsize and positively a¤ect productivity at non
HWFs. Below, I further discuss the validity of the IV strategy.
Turning to the details of the instrument, a downsizing rm must see an em-
ployment reduction larger than 3 percent compared to the previous years level.
The division of good rms into downsizing and non-downsizing rms according to
this criterion is less sensible for small rms. Accordingly, I impose the additional
condition that the decrease in the labor force is greater than or equal to three
individuals.
Table 3 shows the results from the IV estimation of Equation (3). Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the LLM.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The F test of excluded instruments in Column 1 gives a statistic of 23.116. The
e¤ect of H on productivity is large: cHIV = 0.268. However, the standard error
is also large (0.154). The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10 percent level.
A concern for the validity of the exclusion restriction arises from the observation
that the dependent variable in my econometric model is the value of output.17
Unobserved shifts in local demand from HWFs to non HWFs might simultane-
16The coe¢ cient of the number of downsizing rm in the rst-stage regression is equal to .017 (standard
error is 0.003). A one standard deviation increase in the instrumental variable is associated with an
increase in H of 0.02.
17The theoretically correct dependent variable in a productivity study is the quantity of output, but,
due to data limitations, this study (and virtually all the empirical literature on productivity) uses price
multiplied by quantity.
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ously lead to (a) higher output prices for non HWFs, (b) downsizing by HWFs
and (c) hiring of HWF employees by non HWFs. The LLM-year e¤ects control for
local demand shocks, but localized unobservable industry shocks may still play
a role. Consequently, in principle, it is possible that cHIV > 0 reects higher
output prices, rather than higher productivity due to knowledge transfer. I do
not expect this to be a major factor in my context; manufacturing rms in my
sample generally produce goods traded outside the LLM.18 To further explore
this possibility in Column 2 I add a dummy taking value one if the industry
produces goods that are not widely traded outside the LLM.19 The results in
Column 2 are very similar to those in Column 1.
Even when the level of tradability is controlled for, product demand e¤ects
might still be relevant and cHIV might therefore be biased if an industry is
strongly localized. In such a scenario the negative shock to the local HWF may
lead to increased demand for the non HWF rm j even though the HWF and
the non HWF produce a tradable good. This is because, since most of the
rms producing that particular good in Italy are in the same Veneto LLM, the
non HWF may experience an increase in demand, and hence in price, after the
negative shock to a local HWF that is a direct competitor on the national market.
To address this concern, I construct an index of industry localization as follows
rs = (Italian Firms in s)=(V eneto F irms in s): Industries with low r have a
relatively small number of rms outside the Veneto area. In Column 3 I enter
rs as additional regressor: the F test gives a slightly larger statistic (24.4) andcHIV is estimated slightly more precisely (standard error is 0.145). The point
estimate is very similar.
Finally, in column 4 I use a stricter denition of downsizing rms: a downsizing
rm must see an employment reduction larger than 5 percent compared to the
18 Imagine the extreme case of a non-HWF that produces a nationally traded good in a perfectly
competitive industry. Its output prices would not increase disproportionately if the LLM experienced an
increased demand for its good.
19See Section A.V for details.
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previous years level.20 The F test gives a slightly lower statistic (21.6), the
standard error is larger (0.164) and cH is no longer signicant at 10 percent
level. However, the point estimate is quite similar to that in the previous columns
(0.231).
Recall the OLS estimates: (a) the coe¢ cient on knowledgeable workers is 0.039
and (b) the coe¢ cient on knowledgeable workers moving within the same two-
digit industry is 0.072. In principle, the IV estimates (that are likely to be
driven by ows within industries, given the way the instrument is designed) are
consistent with the idea that the OLS coe¢ cient is biased downward because of
negative selection (lemons bias). In practice, however, the IV standard errors are
large and prevent me from drawing denitive conclusions.
Another tentative explanation for the magnitude of the IV results is that the
e¤ect of knowledgeable workers may be heterogeneous across rms. If there are
indeed heterogeneous e¤ects of H on productivity, then consistent OLS measures
the average e¤ect of H on productivity across all rms, while Two Stage Least
Squares (TSLS) estimates the average e¤ect in the subset of rms that are mar-
ginal in the recruitment decision, in the sense that they recruit knowledgeable
workers if and only if there exists excess local supply.21 If the e¤ect of knowl-
edgeable workers on productivity is larger for non HWFs that are marginal in the
recruitment decision, the TSLS estimates will exceed those of consistent OLS.
VII. Worker ows and agglomeration advantages
In this Section I assess the extent to which worker ows can explain the pro-
ductivity advantages of rms located near other highly productive rms. In order
to do so, I simulate an event analogous to that studied by GHM but within my
framework, and I predict the change in local productivity that is due to labor
20 I keep the additional condition that the decrease in the labor force is greater than or equal to three
individuals. Both the baseline instrumental variable and this alternative one are summarized in Table
A.5.
21See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a discussion. For a recent example, see Eisensee and Strömberg
(2007).
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mobility. The event I simulate is an increase in the number of good rms such
that the change in local output is comparable to the output of the average large
plant whose opening is considered by GHM.22
An overview of my procedure is as follows. Denote the number of knowledgeable
workers moving within industry observed at rm j with H ind. As a rst step, I
estimate the e¤ect on H indj of a change in the number of good local rms within
the same industry as j. If a worker is hired from a HWF in the same industry
at time t   g, she contributes to H indj from year t   g until t.23 This implies
that H ind exhibits a certain degree of persistence and suggests estimation of a
dynamic model for the number of workers observed at rm j who have HWF
experience in the same industry.
In the second step, I predict the change in H ind that each of the non HWFs in
a LLM would experience if an output increase similar to the one considered by
GHM were to occur, and I multiply the predicted change in H ind by cHind, the
estimated coe¢ cient on H ind in my productivity regression. This product yields
the predicted change in productivity due to worker ows for a given Veneto rm
if its locality and industry were to experience an increase in output analogous to
that considered by GHM.
In the nal step, I compare my estimate of the predicted contribution of worker
ows to productivity changes with GHMs estimate of the overall productivity
e¤ect. This comparison allows me to have a sense of the extent to which worker
ows can explain the productivity gains experienced by other rms when high-
productivity rms in the same industry are added to a local labor market.
I will now discuss the issues related to the implementation of the rst step, i.e.
22The large plants in GHM generated bidding from local governments, almost certainly because there
was a belief of important positive e¤ects on the local economy. GHM observe that the mean increase
in TFP after the opening is (a) increasing over time and (b) larger if incumbent plants have the same
industrial classication as the large plant. These two facts are consistent with the presence of intellectual
externalities that are embodied in workers who move from rm to rm. I think of the plants considered
by GHM as goodplants, and in order to simulate their experiment I consider a change in the number
of Veneto good rms such that the change in local output is comparable.
23 It may be instructive to consider a practical example. Consider a worker who joins HWF j in 1995
after separating from a HWF in 1992. If the worker remains in j until 2000, she will contributes to Hindj
count for every year from 1995 to 2000.
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the estimation of the dynamic e¤ect on H indj of a change in the number of good
rms in the same locality and industry.
A. A dynamic model for the number of knowledgeable workers
Consider a model of the form
(8) H indjlst = aH
ind
jsl;t 1 + bGood_Firmsls(j)t + ejlst
ejlst = mj + vjlst
(9) E[mj ] = E[vjlst] = E[mjvjlst] = 0
where Good_Firmsls(j)t is the number of local good rms in the same industry
of rm j: Recall that the subscript ind represent workers moving within industry.
The disturbance term ejlst has two orthogonal components: the rm e¤ect, mj
and the idiosyncratic shock, vjlst: Using OLS to estimate Equation (8) is prob-
lematic because the correlation between H indjsl;t 1 and the rm e¤ect in the error
term gives rise to "dynamic panel bias" (Nickell, 1981). Application of the Within
Groups estimator would draw the rm e¤ects out of the error term, but dynamic
panel bias would remain (Bond, 2002). Therefore I employ the rst-di¤erence
transform, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991):
(10) H indjlst = aH
ind
jsl;t 1 + bGood_Firmsls(j)t +vjlst
The rm e¤ects have now disappeared, but the lagged dependent variable is
still potentially endogenous as the H indjsl;t 1 in H
ind
jsl;t 1 = H
ind
jsl;t 1   H indjsl;t 2 is
correlated with the vjls;t 1 in vjlst = vjls;t vjls;t 1. However, longer lags of the
regressors remain orthogonal to the error and are available for use as instruments.
Natural candidate instruments for H indjsl;t 1 are H
ind
jsl;t 2 and H
ind
jsl;t 2 : Both
H indjsl;t 2 and H
ind
jsl;t 2 are mathematically related to H
ind
jsl;t 1 = H
ind
jsl;t H indjsl;t 1
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but not to the error term vjlst = vjls;t   vjls;t 1, provided that the vjlst are not
serially correlated.24
In principle, another challenge in estimating (10) is that rms in a given indus-
try do not select their location randomly. Firms maximize prots and decide to
locate where their expectation of the present discounted value of future prots is
greatest. This net present value di¤ers across locations depending on many fac-
tors, including transportation infrastructure, subsidies, etc. These factors, whose
value may be di¤erent for rms in di¤erent industries, are unobserved, and they
may be correlated with H indjlst. It should be noted, however, that a positive shock
in LLM j and industry s such that there is entry of HWFs (i.e. an increase in
Good_Firmsls(j)t) makes it less likely that a non HWFs is going to hire from
a good rm in the same industry. This is because the shock is good news for good
rms, so in principle it should make it less likely for the labor force at the good
rms to experience a decrease, and in turn, it should make it less likely for a non
HWF to hire from a good rm. The bias introduced by the fact that good rms do
not choose their location randomly is therefore likely to be downwards, and thus
working against the nding of a positive e¤ect of Good_firmsls(j)t on H ind:
In any case, Good_Firmsls(j)t is treated as endogenous in the estimation.
Table 4 gives the results of estimating Equation (10) for the period 1989-2001.25
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Column 1 uses the classic Arellano-Bond Di¤erence GMM estimator and shows
a positive (0.004) and signicant coe¢ cient of the number of good local rms.
This is in line with the idea discussed above of an important role of geographic
and economic proximity in determining worker mobility. Column 1 also shows
a positive (0.231) and signicant coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent variable.
24Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term
vjlst. It checks for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for correlation of order l + 1 in
di¤erences. I employ this test below.
25 I include time dummies in order to remove universal time-related shocks from the errors. Since these
specications do not require information collected from AIDA balance sheets, the sample period is not
restricted to post-1995 observations.
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The p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions does not suggest
misspecication. The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation fails to indicate
that the vjlst are serially correlated.
Columns 2 to 4 investigate the robustness of these estimates to di¤erent speci-
cations. I begin by using a di¤erent transform, proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995), namely the "forward orthogonal deviations" transform.26 I then estimate
the model with two-step GMM and Windmeijer (2005)-corrected cluster-robust
errors.27 Finally I estimate the model with two-step GMM, Windmeijer-corrected
standard errors and orthogonal deviations. The estimates in Columns 2 to 4 are
similar to those in Column 1.
B. Simulation Results
Having estimated the dynamic e¤ect onH indj of a change inGood_Firmsls(j)t; I
can predict the changes inH, and hence in productivity, that a given non-HWF in
Veneto would experience after an output increase similar to the one considered by
GHM. As it turns out, the large manufacturing plants whose openings are studied
by GHM are much larger than the typical good rm in Veneto.28 In order to
observe a change in local output comparable to the typical output increase caused
by the opening of one large plant in GHM, a Veneto locality must experience an
increase of 56 HWFs. This is the shock in my simulation.
The predicted change in H that each non-HWF would experience after 5 years,
the time horizon considered in GHM, is then dH ind;5 years = 56  (b+ ab+ a2b+
a3b+ a4b+ a5b): This change in H can be obtained using the estimates for a and
26Rather than subtracting the observation in t 1 from the observation in t, the orthogonal deviations
transform subtracts the average of all future available observations of a variable. This has the advantage
of reducing data loss because, no matter how many gaps, it is computable for each rm. Since I remove all
rm-year observations with remarkably high or low values for the number of employees, my estimation
panel indeed has some gaps, which are magnied by the rst-di¤erence transform. (If some Hjlst is
missing, for example, then both Hjlst and Hjlst+1 are missing in the rst-di¤erenced data.)
27See Roodman (2009) for a detailed discussion of two-step GMM and Windmeijer-correction.
28This is due both to the fact that new entrants in GHM are signicantly larger than the average new
plant in the United States and the fact that the Veneto region is characterized by the presence of small
and medium-sized businesses, whose size is smaller than the typical rm in United States. See Section
A.VI for descriptive statistics.
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b from Table 4.
In order to obtain the predicted change in productivity, I rst obtain cHind
by estimating Equation (3) after replacing Hj with H indj : The results using the
di¤erent approaches (baseline OLS, OP, LP, polynomial functions of capital and
investments or capital and materials in t and t+1) are shown in Table A.7. Using
the baseline OLS productivity regression, estimated in Column 1 of Table A.7, the
predicted change in productivity attributable to worker ows ve years the local
output increase is equal to dTFP ind;5 years = dH ind;5 years  cHind;OLS = 0:022:
The nal step is to compare the magnitude of dTFP ind;5 yearswith GHMs
estimate of the overall productivity e¤ect caused by a local output increase.
The increase in productivity estimated by GHM ve years after the opening for
incumbent plants in the same two-digit industry equals 17 percent. Hence, my
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that worker ows explain 13.3 percent
of the agglomeration advantages estimated by GHM. Replacing cHind;OLS withcHind;LP , the average e¤ect of recruiting a knowledgeable worker with experience
in the same industry estimated in the LP specication (Column 3 of Table A.7),
the contribution of worker ows to the agglomeration advantages estimated by
GHM is equal to 8.1 percent.
Overall, the results in this section of the paper suggest that worker ows explain
an economically relevant proportion of the productivity gains experienced by
other rms when HWFs in the same industry are added to a local labor market.
VIII. Conclusions
Identifying the microeconomic mechanisms underlying localized productivity
spillovers is crucial for understanding agglomeration economies. Without know-
ing the precise nature of the interactions between rms and workers that generate
agglomeration advantages, it is di¢ cult to be condent about the existence of any
such advantages. Additionally, pinpointing the ultimate causes of agglomeration
advantages is helpful for understanding di¤erences in productivity across industry
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clusters and localities. Finally, better knowledge of the sources of the productiv-
ity advantages of agglomeration is important for determining the optimal design
of location-based policies.
This paper directly examined the role of labor mobility as a mechanism for
the transfer of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge and evaluated the extent to which
labor mobility can explain the productivity advantages of rms located near other
highly productive rms. In order to empirically assess the importance of labor-
market based knowledge spillovers, I used Social Security earnings records and
detailed nancial information for rms from the Veneto region of Italy.
While the issues analyzed in this paper are of general interest, the case of
Veneto is important because this region is part of a larger economic area of Italy
where, as in the Silicon Valley, networks of specialized small and medium-sized
rms, frequently organized in districts, have been e¤ective in promoting and
adapting to technological change during the last three decades. This so called
"Third Italy" region has received a good deal of attention by researchers, in the
United States as well as in Europe (Brusco, 1983; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Trigilia,
1990; Whitford, 2001; Piore, 2009).
The empirical evidence presented using the unique dataset from Veneto points
to the concrete possibility that agglomeration of economic activity creates im-
portant productivity advantages at the local level. The productivity benets of
a non-HWF from being located in a cluster with a large number of good rms
rest with the opportunities to hire workers whose knowledge was gained in good
rms. Such knowledge can be successfully adapted internally. More specically,
the regression analysis showed that hiring a worker with HWF experience in-
creases the productivity of other (non-HWF) rms. A simulation indicated that
worker ows explain 10-15 percent of the productivity gains experienced by other
rms when HWFs in the same industry are added to a local labor market.
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Table 1 Characteristics of HWFs, 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Y/L VA/L K/L Tangible Intangible
K/L K/L
HWF 0.150 0.113 0.104 0.066 0.270
(0.017) (0.012) (0.025) (0.027) (0.042)
Observations 26041 26041 26041 26041 26041
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.106 0.181 0.187 0.0644
Dependent Variables are in logs. All OLS regressions include year and 4-digit industry
dummies. Output, Value Added and Capital variables are in 1000s of 2000 euros. Standard
errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. The dummy HWF takes value 1 if the rm is
classied as high-wage after estimating the AKM model on the period 1987-2000.
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Table 2 H Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, Main Estimates, 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OP LP Inv-Cap Inv-Mat Same/Di¤
Interact. Interact. Industry
log(capital) 0.097 0.093 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.097
(0.005) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
log(materials) 0.571 0.576 0.591 -3.878 0.571
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.510) (0.008)
log(employees) 0.235 0.235 0.204 0.212 0.181 0.235
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
H workers 0.039 0.037 0.020 0.039 0.022
(0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009)
H from same Ind 0.072
(0.018)
H from di¤ Ind 0.024
(0.009)
sameH = 
diff
H ;pv 0.018
Observations 17937 6892 17937 3063 14120 17937
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.930 0.948 0.924
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. H workers is the
number of workers with HWF experience currently observed at non-HWFs. Column 1 reports estimates
from the baseline specication. Column 2 implements the procedure in Olley and Pakes (1996). Column
3 implements the procedure in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Column 4 adds a third-degree polynomial
function of log capital and log investment and the interaction of both functions in t and t+1. Column 5
includes the same controls as col. 5 but replaces log investment with log materials. Column 6 di¤erentiates
between workers moving within the same industry and between industries. sameH = 
diff
H ;pv is the p-value
of the equality of coe¢ cients of the variable H from same Indand the variable H from di¤ Ind.
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Table 3 Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, IV Estimates 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline tradability localization 5 percent
H workers 0.268 0.269 0.278 0.231
(0.154) (0.154) (0.145) (0.164)
log(capital) 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
log(materials) 0.568 0.568 0.568 0.568
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
log(employees) 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.229
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 17937 17937 17937 17937
Adj. R-squared 0.908 0.908 0.907 0.910
Fstat, instrum., 1st stage 23.06 23.14 24.41 21.55
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by LLM (47). Regressions
include industry-year interaction dummies and LLM-year interaction dummies. Column 1 reports IV
estimates using the lagged number of downsizing local good rms in the same 5-digit industry. A good
rm is considered as downsizing if the drop in L is larger than 3 percent. The decrease in the labor force
must also be greater than or equal to three individuals. Column 2 adds an indicator of the importance
of local demand, namely a dummy taking value 1 if the 4-digit industry produces goods that are not
widely traded outside the LLM. Column 3 controls for an index of industry localization, namely the ratio
between the number of rms in Veneto and total Italian rms in a given 4-digit industry. In Column 4
a good rm is considered as downsizing if the drop in L is larger than 5 percent.
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Table 4 Number of local HWFs in same Industry and Knowledgeable Workers moving within
industry, GMM Estimates, 1989-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Deviations Two-step Deviations/
Two-step
lag(H from same Ind) 0.231 0.355 0.150 0.208
(0.079) (0.122) (0.081) (0.115)
Local HWFs in same Ind 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 29554 29933 29554 29933
AR(1)z -6.164 -5.053 -5.244 -4.063
AR(2)z 0.109 0.458 -0.405 -0.237
HansPv 0.272 0.366 0.272 0.366
Dependent variable: H from same Ind, the number of H workers moving within Industry. Cluster-robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include year dummies. Column 1 reports the baseline Di¤erence
GMM results. Column 2 uses the forward orthogonal deviations transform, proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995). Column 3 estimates the model with two-step GMM and Windmeijer-corrected standard
errors. Column 4 estimates the model with two-step GMM, Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and
orthogonal deviations. The variable Local HWFs in same industryis treated as endogenous. AR(1)z and
AR(2)z: Arelanno and Bond (1999) test of rst and second order serial correlation, distributed as N(0,1).
HansPv: p-value of Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. For all variables only the shortest allowable
lagged is used as instrument.
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I. Data: Sample Restrictions and Descriptive Statistics
I use rm identiers to match job-year observations for workers aged 16-64
in the VWH with rm nancial data in AIDA for the period 1995-2001. The
match rate is fairly high: at least one observation in the VHW was found for
over 95 percent of the employers in the AIDA sample, and around 50 percent of
employees observed in the VWH between 1995 and 2001 can be matched to an
AIDA rm. Most of the nonmatches seem to be workers of small rms THAT are
omitted from AIDA. In sum, I was able to match at least one employee for around
18,000 rms, or around 10 percent of the entire universe of employers contained
in the VWH.29 From this set of potential matches I execute two exclusions to
obtain my estimation sample for Equation (6). First, I remove all workers outside
manufacturing. Next, I exclude job-year observations with remarkably high or
low values for wages (I trim observations outside the 1 percent - 99 percent range).
The method in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) identies separate groups
of workers and rms that are connected via labor mobility in the data. I run the
grouping algorithm separately using VHW data from 1987 to 2000 for rms that
could be matched in AIDA and have more than 10 employees in VHW. I then use
the created group variable to choose the largest group as the sample for my xed-
e¤ects estimation. The largest group contains 99.1 percent of the woker-year
observations (2,567,040 observations combining 457,763 individuals with 5,937
rms). I identify HWFs as those rms whose rm e¤ects rank in the top third
of the sample.30 Table A.2 illustrates that, in contrast to rm characteristics,
workforce characteristics of HWFs and non HWFs are not so di¤erent: the shares
of white collar workers and managers are 1.8 and 0.3 percentage points higher,
29Card, Devicienti and Maida (2011) show that the average rm size for the matched jobs sample
(36.0 workers) is considerably larger than that for total employers in the VWH (7.0 workers). Mean
daily wages for the matched observations are also greater, while the fractions of under 30 and female
employees are lower.
30 In order to implement the approach in Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002), I use the a2reg Stata
routine developed by Ouazad (2007).
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respectively, in HWFs; the share of female workers is 3.1 percentage points lower.
No di¤erence emerges in the share of workers younger than 30 or older than 45.
31
The sample of non HWFs used in the main rm-level analysis equation (3) -
is summarized in Table A.1.32 The main analysis is performed over the period for
which balance sheet data are available (1995-2001). Notice the overlap with the
period over which Equation (6) is estimated (1987-2000). In principle one would
like to perform the two estimations - Equation (6) and (3) - on two di¤erent sam-
ples. However, in practice the AKM routine requires a large number of events of
labor mobility in order for the rm and worker e¤ects to be identied. Moreover,
to precisely estimate cH one would like to exploit as much variation as possible
in H, i.e. as many moves from good rms to other rms as possible. Choosing
2000 as the end period for the rst estimation seems a good compromise because
(a): it guarantees a long enough panel for the AKM estimation, (b) it allows
consideration of all the possible moves from good rms to other rms (including
in particular workers who separate from good rms in 2000 and are observed in
other rms in 2001) and (c) still prevents a full overlapping between the two sam-
ple periods for the two di¤erent estimations. I experimented with other choices
for the period of the AKM estimation, such as 1986-2000 or 1987-1999. Results
are very similar and available upon request.
31Notice that since the specications in Table A.2 do not require information collected from AIDA
balance sheets, the sample period is not restricted to post-1995 observations.
32 In order to obtain this estimation sample I rst remove HWF observations from the sample of
worker-rm matches. From this non-HWF sample I remove (a) rms that close during the calendar year
and (b) rm-year observations with remarkably high or low values (outside the 1% - 99% range) for
several key rm-level variables, such as total value of production, number of employees, capital stock
and value of materials. (c) rms in LLM with centroids outside Veneto (3 LLMs). I then attempt to
reduce the inuence of false matches, particularly for larger rms, by implementing a strategy of Card,
Devicienti and Maida (2011) to eliminate the "gross outliers", a minor number of matches (less than 1%
of all employers) for which the absolute gap between the number of workers reported in a rms AIDA
balance sheet and the number found in the VWH is larger than 100.
VOL. VOLUME NO. ISSUE GOOD FIRMS, WORKER FLOWS AND PRODUCTIVITY 37
II. The Extent of Labor Mobility
For labor mobility to be a mechanism for transfer of knowledge, we must observe
some workers moving from HWFs to other rms. On average, between 1995
and 2001, 4.3 percent of non HWFs in a given year employ workers with HWF
experience. Overall, 1187 workers switch from HWFs to non HWFs during my
sample period.33
It is important to observe that these numbers do not imply that in a typical
year 4.3 percent of Veneto rms are potentially a¤ected by knowledge transfer.
Recall that I only consider ows from rms in the top third of estimated rm
xed e¤ects to rms in the bottom third. As a result, these numbers should be
interpreted as implying that in a typical year about 4.3 percent of the rms in the
bottom third of the distribution employ at least one worker with experience at a
rm in the top third. There obviously exists signicant labor mobility within the
two groups that may also serve as a channel of knowledge transfer. To illustrate,
one can intuitively imagine that a worker moving from a rm in the 1st percentile
of the distribution to a rm in the 19th percentile may bring e¢ ciency-enhancing
knowledge to his or her new job34, and the same can be imagined for a worker
moving from a rm in the 21st percentile to a rm in the 99th percentile. However
I focus solely on ows between the two groups.
It is also important to note that the percentage of rms that employ workers
with HWF experience varies with the threshold that I impose on the distribution.
For instance, if I dene HWFs as rms with xed e¤ects in the top half of
the overall distribution, 8.4 percent of non HWFs employ workers with HWF
experience, compared with 4.3 percent if HWFs are dened by falling in the top
33787 are blue collar workers, 331 are white collar workers, 46 are managers and 23 are apprentices.
34Despite potential lawsuits due to violations of non-compete covenants and trade secret law, one
frequently observes top rms poaching employees from competitors in an e¤ort to acquire some of their
internal knowledge. This poaching is sometimes so intense that companies may cut deals to refrain from
competing for employees. In December 2010, the U.S. Justice Department settled an antitrust suit with
Lucaslm over a no solicitationagreement with rival Pixar. In September of the same year, the Justice
Department had settled another suit over similar agreements involving Adobe Systems, Apple, Google,
Intel, Intuit and Pixar (The New York Times, January 2, 2011).
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third of the xed-e¤ects distribution.
In the main text I show estimates of the extent to which non HWFs benet
from hiring workers from HWFs by entering an annual rm-level measure (H)
of the number of workers with experience at HWFs into a production function.
Since only a small subest of non HWFs in a given year employ workers with HWF
experience, the mean value of H workers across the sample of non HWFs is small
(0.071). The maximum value is 7. Notice that the mean number of employees at
non HWFs is 48, and the median is 33.
As regards to individual characteristics of the movers in my sample, in all years
movers from HWFs are signicantly more likely to be young and male than non
HWFs workers without experience at good rms. In most years, these movers
are also signicantly more likely to be white-collar workers and managers. Table
A.3 and A.4 give descriptive statistics in the most recent year (2001) for movers
from good rms to non HWFs and non HWFs workers without experience at
good rms.
III. The Role of Geographical Proximity
There exist at least two reasons why geographic proximity might be important
for observed worker ows. First, distance may act as a barrier for workersjob
mobility because of commuting costs or idiosyncratic preferences for location.
Descriptive statistics in Combes and Duranton (2006) show that labor ows in
France are mostly local: about 75% of skilled workers remain in the same employ-
ment area when they switch rms. The degree of geographical mobility implied
by this gure is small, since the average French employment area is comparable
to a circle of radius 23 kilometers. In Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013), ran-
domized job o¤ers produce causal estimates of the e¤ect of commuting distance
on job acceptance rates. Distance appears to be a very strong (and negative)
determinant of job acceptance: applicants are 33% less likely to accept a job
o¤er if the municipality to which they are assigned is more than 80 kilometers
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away from their home municipality. The estimates in Manning and Petrongolo
(2013) also suggest a relatively fast decay of job utility with distance. Another
reason geographical proximity may be an important determinant of job mobil-
ity is that the rms informational cost of identifying the right" employee are
larger across localities than within them. A similar argument can be made for
the informational costs for workers.
IV. Sensitivity analysis
The main empirical result in the rst part of the paper is that labor mobility
from HWFs to other rms in the region works as a mechanism for the transfer
of e¢ ciency-enhancing knowledge. Table A.6 shows results from a series of spec-
ication checks. As a basis for comparison, Column 1 shows the estimates from
the baseline specication in Column 1 of Table 2. Considering the di¤erences
in observable characteristics documented in Section A.II between movers from
HWFs and other workers at non HWFs, in Column 2 I augment Equation (3)
with the share of females, managers, blue-collar and white-collar workers, and
di¤erently aged workers at each rm. The results largely remained unchanged.
Column 3 shows estimates using the within-transformation. These estimates
should be interpreted cautiously because the within estimator is known from
practical experience to perform poorly in the context of production functions
(Eberhardt and Helmer, 2010). Indeed, estimates in Column 3 indicate severely
decreasing returns to scale, likely due to measurement error in the input variables,
whose inuence is exacerbated by the variable transformation. The problem of
using the within-transformation is the removal of considerable information from
the data, since only variation over time is left to identify parameters. Setting
this concern aside, the results show a positive and signicant coe¢ cient on H
(0.012) that is smaller than the baseline OLS coe¢ cient, and the coe¢ cients in
other specications reported in Table 2.
Columns 4-5 investigate the role of functional form assumption. Until now,
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I have presented results based on specications where the intensity of potential
knowledge transferred is measured by the number of H workers. In Column 4, I
model this intensity as the share of workers with recent experience at good rms,
dividing H by L. The coe¢ cient is positive and signicant: a one percentage
point increase in h is associated with a change in productivity of 0.8percent.35
In Column 5 I estimate:
ln(Yjslt) = 0 + L ln(jsltLjslt) + K ln(Kjslt) + M ln(Mjslt) + Hl log(Hjslt) +
+1(H = 0)jslt + st +$lt + vjslt
Compared to Equation (3) I replaced Hjslt with its logarithm, and I imposed
log(Hjslt) = 0 for the observations with Hjslt = 0. Plus, I added the dummy
1(H = 0)jslt taking value 1 if the number of knowledgeable workers is equal to 0.
The results using this alternative functional form are again consistent with those
discussed in the main text.
Finally, I address the issue of unobservables related with new hires. If work-
ers who recently changed rms are more productive than stayers, the e¤ect of
newly hired workers with HWF experience may equally apply to newly hired
employees without HWF experience. In order to explore this possibility I rst
dene medium-wage-rms (MWFs) as those whose estimated rm xed e¤ects
from the AKM model fall between the 33th percentile and the 67th percentile of
all estimated rm e¤ects, and low-wage-rms (LWFs) as those whose estimated
rm xed e¤ects fall below the bottom third. I then construct two new variables.
The rst one, denoted with eH is the number of workers with recent experience
at HWFs currently observed at MWF m. I dene a worker as having recent
35Since there may be measurement error in L; the number of employees in the
AIDA data, a potential problem with such specication arises. Rewrite equation (3) as
ln (
Yjst
Ljst
) = K ln (Kjst) + M ln (Mjst) + hhjst+st+$lt+vjslt: Since h = H=L, a mechanical
relantionship between h and the dependent variable may arise at time t. To address this issue, I also use
the lagged share of H workers obtained from head counts in the Social Security dataset. The coe¢ cient
estimate (not shown) is 0.650 (0.345).
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HWF-experience in year t; if he or she is observed working in a HWF for one
or more of the years t   5 to t   1. If a worker is hired at time t   g, and has
experience at a HWF between t  g and t  5, she contributes to eH count from
year t   g until t. 36 The second variable I construct, denoted with eN , is the
number of workers with recent experience at LWFs currently observed at MWF
m. I then estimate for the sample of MWFs:
ln(Ymslt) = 0 + L ln(msltLmslt) + K ln(Kmslt) + M ln(Mmslt) +
+ eH eHmslt +  eN eNmslt + st +$lt + vmslt
In this specication, the identication of knowledge transfer relies on the dif-
ferential e¤ect of hiring an employee with recent HWF experience over hiring an
employee from a LWF. By including both eH and eN , any potential bias caused
by the correlation between unobservables and new hires is removed. Column 6
shows the results. The coe¢ cient of eH is positive (.041) and signicant. The
coe¢ cient of eN is positive but smaller (0.015) and not signicant. The di¤er-
ence in productivity e¤ects associated with each type of "movers" is signicant
at 10 percent level. The productivity e¤ect attributed to knowledgeable workers,
therefore, does not appear to be associated with recently hired workers in general.
That large productivity gains linked to hiring seem to be realized only when new
hires come from more productive rms is consistent with the knowledge spillovers
hypothesis.
V. Non-Tradable Goods
In Column 2 I added a dummy taking value one if the industry produces goods
that are not widely traded outside the LLM. Industries for which the dummy
takes value one are those classied as SMSA industries by Weiss (1974): Bot-
36 It may be instructive to consider a practical example. Consider a worker who separates from a HWF
in 1992 and joins MWF m in 1995. Provided that the worker remains in j, she will be counted as a
knowledgeable worker for every year from 1995 to 1997.
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tled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated, Mineral, and Plain Waters; Fluid
Milk; Bread and Other Bakery Products, Except Cookies and Crackers; Manufac-
tured Ice; Primary Forest Products; Newspapers; Commercial Printing (except
Lithographic); Commercial Printing (Lithographic); Engraving and Plate Print-
ing; Typesetting; Photo-Engraving; Electrotyping and Stereotyping; Ready-Mix
Concrete.
VI. Simulation details
Table 1 in GHM reports statistics for the sample of plants whose opening is
considered in their study. These plants are quite large: they are more than twice
the size of the average incumbent plant and account for roughly nine percent
of the average countys total output one year prior to their opening. The mean
output (ve years after their assigned opening date) is 452,801, 000 of year-2006
dollars, or 395,476,000 of 2000 euros. Standard deviation is 901,690, 000 of year-
2006 dollars. As explained in the notes of Table 1 in GHM, these statistics are for
a subset of the 47 plant openings studied by the authors. In particular, a few very
large outlier plants were dropped so that the mean would be more representative
of the entire distribution (those dropped had output greater than half of their
countys previous output and sometimes much more).
In order to establish the increase in the number of HWFs that a Veneto locality
must experience to observe a change in local output comparable to the output
increase caused by the opening of one large plant in GHM, I need to obtain the
value of output for a typical HWF. Instead of dropping very large outlier plans
as in GHM, I take the median of the distribution. The median value of output
for HWFs in my sample is 7,028,000 of year-2000 euros. Therefore a Veneto
locality must experience an increase of 395,476,000/7,028,000=56 HWFs. This
is the shock in my simulation.
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VIII. Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A1. Distribution of Firm E¤ects
44 MONTH YEAR
Figure A2. Distribution of HWFs across Local Labor Markets (LLMs)
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Table A.1 non-HWFs, Main Estimation Sample
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Output 8205.547 (9085.215) 1086.012 83537.188 17937
Capital 1829.342 (2400.112) 57.222 20876.002 17937
materials 4148.033 (5403.845) 68.405 47337.867 17937
value added 2088.875 (2293.955) -4082.134 34466.188 17937
Tangible Capital 1691.601 (2265.701) 2.833 20668 17937
Intangible Capital 137.741 (382.714) 0 11837.857 17937
employees from AIDA 48.069 (47.239) 2 420 17937
employees from VWH 49.173 (45.404) 11 458 17937
apprentices 1.033 (2.004) 0 47 17937
blue collars 30.178 (30.144) 0 348 17937
white collars 9.638 (11.927) 0 251 17937
managers 0.662 (1.855) 0 54 17937
female employees 13.157 (18.874) 0 309 17937
employees age< 30 13.988 (13.499) 0 201 17937
employees age> 45 9.128 (12.893) 0 199 17937
H workers 0.071 (0.302) 0 7 17937
H workers same Ind 0.021 (0.161) 0 5 17937
H workers di¤ Ind 0.051 (0.245) 0 7 17937
H managers 0.003 (0.053) 0 2 17937
H white collars 0.024 (0.164) 0 3 17937
H blue collars 0.044 (0.231) 0 6 17937
Sample includes 3661 Individual Firms in the period 1995-2001. Output, Capital, Materials, Value Added are
in thousands of 2000 euros. Employees from AIDA refers to the values found in the AIDA balance sheet data.
Employees from VWH refers to the values obtained from head count in the Veneto Worker History data from Social
Security.
Table A.2 Characteristics of HWFs Workforce, 1987-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
share share share share share
white coll. manager female age<30 age>45
HWF 0.018 0.003 -0.031 0.000 -0.006
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 58102 58102 58102 58102 58102
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.103 0.569 0.167 0.140
All OLS regressions include year and 4-digit industry dummies. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) clustered by rm. The dummy HWF takes value 1 if the rm is classied as high-wage
after estimating the AKM model on the period 1987-2000.
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Table A.3 Characteristics of Knowledgeable Workers observed at non-HWFs, 2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
age 33.813 (8.481) 18 62 407
female 0.251 (0.434) 0 1 407
blue collar 0.548 (0.498) 0 1 407
white collar 0.388 (0.488) 0 1 407
manager 0.049 (0.216) 0 1 407
Table A.4 Characteristics of Workers without HWF experience observed at non-HWFs,
2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
age 37.08 (9.538) 16 65 192588
female 0.32 (0.467) 0 1 192588
blue collar 0.71 (0.454) 0 1 192352
white collar 0.242 (0.428) 0 1 192352
manager 0.023 (0.15) 0 1 192352
Table A.5 Instrumental Variables, 1995-2001
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
lag (downsizing HWFs, > 3 percent) 0.33 (0.973) 0 7 17937
lag (downsizing HWFs, > 5 percent) 0.307 (0.909) 0 7 17937
The variable lag (downsizing HWFs, > 3 percent) is the lagged number of downsizing local good rms in
a given 5-digit industry. A good rm is considered as downsizing if the drop in L is larger than 3 percent.
The decrease in the labor force must also be greater than or equal to three individuals. In constructing the
variable downsizing HWFs, > 5 percenta good rm is considered as downsizing if the drop in L is larger
than 5 percent.
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Table A.6 Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in non-HWFs, Robustness to Different
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Workforce Within Share Log Recent
OLS Characteristics Experience
log(capital) 0.097 0.093 0.066 0.097 0.097 0.095
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
log(materials) 0.571 0.561 0.586 0.571 0.571 0.565
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
log(employees) 0.235 0.243 0.064 0.238 0.235 0.251
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
H workers 0.039 0.034 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
share H workers 0.765
(0.171)
log(H workers) 0.066
(0.030)
No H workers -0.040
(0.011)
Recent HWF exp 0.041
(0.010)
Recent LWF exp 0.015
(0.011)
HWFeH = LWFeN ;pv 0.092
Observations 17937 17937 17937 17937 17937 9269
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.925 0.985 0.924 0.924 0.932
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. Regressions include industry-
year interaction dummies and LLM-year interaction dummies. The variable H workersis the number of knowledgeable
workers currently observed at non-HWFs. The variable log(H workers) is the logarithm of number of knowledgeable
workers. The dummy No H workerstakes value 1 if the number of knowledgeable workers is equal to 0. The variable
Recent HWF exp is the number of workers currently observed at Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline
specication. Column 2 adds the shares of managers, white collars, blue collars, females, and di¤erently aged workers.
Column 3 reports within estimates. Column 4 replaces the number of H workers with the share of H workers. Column
5 replaces the number of H workers with the log of H workers plus the dummy No H workers. Column 6 is estimated
on the sample of MWFs and includes workers with recent experience at HWF and Low-Wage-Firms (LWFs). HWFeH =
LWFeN ;pv is the p-value of the equality of coe¢ cients of the variable Recent HWF expand the variable Recent LWF
exp
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Table A.7 Knowledgeable Workers with experience in the same industry and Productivity
in non-HWFs, 1995-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline OP LP Inv-Cap Inv-Mat
OLS Interactions Interactions
log(capital) 0.098 0.094 0.149 ... ...
(0.005) (0.021) (0.010)
log(materials) 0.571 0.576 0.592 ...
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
log(employees) 0.235 0.235 0.204 0.213 0.181
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
H workers same Ind 0.073 0.078 0.044 0.094 0.058
(0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.045) (0.016)
Observations 17937 6892 17937 3063 14120
Adj. R-squared 0.924 0.930 0.948
Dependent variable: Log(Output). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by rm. The variable H workers same
Indis the number of workers with HWF experience in the same industry currently observed at non-HWFs. Column
1 reports estimates from the baseline specication. Column 2 implements the procedure in Olley and Pakes (1996).
Column 3 implements the procedure in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Column 4 adds a third-degree polynomial
function of log capital and log investment and the interaction of both functions in t and t+1. Column 5 includes
the same controls as col. 5 but replaces log investment with log materials.
